U.S. Policy and the Militarization of Mexico

Underpinnings and Consequences
U.S. Policy and the Militarization of Mexico

Prepared by Matthew Yarrow for the Latin America/Caribbean Program of the AFSC Peacebuilding Unit

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A brief history of Mexico

Current situation in Mexico

U.S. military policy toward Mexico

Human rights in Mexico

What you can do

Resources for advocacy work

Notes

A brief history of Mexico

The Mexican Revolution, which lasted from approximately 1910 to 1920, was the defining period in twentieth-century Mexican history. The legendary peasant leaders Pancho Villa (from the northern state of Chihuahua) and Emiliano Zapata (from the southern state of Morelos) stood for revolutionary agrarian reform and led rebellions from their respective bases of support. Venustiano Carranza, the conservative governor of Coahuila, took power in 1916 when the villistas and zapatistas proved incapable of creating a joint government. Because of continued unrest, the 1917 Mexican Constitution contained provisions concerning worker rights and land reform.

However, it wasn't until the presidency of Läzaro Cärdenas (1934-1940) that the revolutionary ideas of Zapata and Villa became consolidated at the state level. In a bold move, Cärdenas nationalized British and U.S. oil firms in 1938. He also organized the three broad sectors of Mexican society-campesinos (peasants), union workers, and public employees-into the corporatist structure of his political party, guaranteeing them a voice in national politics. Cärdenas' party was renamed the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in 1946 and to this day is the ruling party. Mexican presidents after Cärdenas began to use the PRI's corporatist structures for social control rather than popular participation. As a result, Mexico has become a stable but undemocratic nation where co-option and corruption are basic instruments of political power. 2

The 1960s were a time of social unrest in Mexico that came to a head in 1968 with the army's massacre of hundreds of students marching for the right to free speech in Mexico City. Social unrest surfaced again in the 1970s and 1980s during a series of economic crises. In the aftermath of a debt crisis in 1982, the Mexican government began abandoning its policy of state participation in the economy and started adopting the free-market policies encouraged by international financial institutions. In the early 1980s, a team of economic "technocrats" began dismantling the state apparatus and privatizing state businesses. Under President Carlos Salinas in the early 1990s, these neoliberal* policies continued with the privatization of Mexican banks, widespread economic deregulation, cuts in social welfare programs, and ultimately the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).3

* The economic school of thought that promotes unfettered economic access.

Current situation in Mexico

The 1990s in Mexico were marked by upheaval and change, including economic disaster, political crisis, indigenous uprisings, implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a fitful process of political democratization, drug trafficking and corruption, and the increased internal presence of the military. These trends are examined below.

Economic issues

The economic integration between the United States and Mexico is key to understanding political relations between the two nations. The North Americcan Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which creates the largest trading area of the Americas, was negotiated in secret by U.S., Mexican, and Canadian officials. It was implemented on Jan.1, 1994, amid claims it would "create a partnership for prosperity where freedom and trade and economic opportunity become the common property of the people of the Americas."4 In preparation for implementation of NAFTA, Mexico amended its constitution to allow the privatization of communal lands, or ejidos, a system originating in the agrarian reforms of the Mexican Revolution. The resulting growth of foreign investment in Mexico's natural resources has had a severe impact on indigenous communities and the poorest sectors of the rural population, as well as threatening ecological communities.

NAFTA makes it easier for corporations to move jobs, plants, and money around North America, enabling the corporations to seek lower wages and weaker environmental regulations. The lowering of tariffs and trade barriers codified under NAFTA has sped the growth of export processing plants (maquiladoras), especially along the U.S. border. The pay in maquiladoras is less than one tenth of U.S. factory wages.* The maquiladoras contribute only minimally to the development of other sectors of the Mexican economy because they receive raw materials from abroad and export their products.

At the end of 1994, facing declining reserves and large debt payments, President Zedillo decided that the government would no longer prop up the peso, and he devalued it by 15 percent. The resulting investor panic caused the peso to drop to less than half of its original value. In the economic crisis that followed, almost 2 million Mexican jobs vanished, and real wages in Mexico declined 27 percent, even with a $52 billion U.S.-sponsored bailout package. The high rates of unemployment and underemployment particularly affected Mexican women who, in addition to facing gender discrimination, are generally employed in vulnerable sectors of the economy. Although it is inaccurate to say NAFTA created these problems, it did add to their severity by restricting options available to the Mexican government for resolving the crisis. Essentially, the austerity measures imposed on Mexico by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the early 1980s and the neoliberal policies adopted by Mexico thereafter are responsible for much of the economic and social predicament Mexico faces today.

Politics and democracy in Mexico

The hotly contested 1988 presidential election, where the Institutional Revolutionary Party engaged in obvious electoral fraud to defeat center-left candidate Cuahtëmoc Cärdenas, shook the authoritarian control of the Party and ushered in a slow and agonizing period of democratization. Economic reforms have disrupted the Party's system of patronage and clientelism and shifted significant political power to forces outside of Mexico, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury.

These economic reforms and austerity measures also contributed to increasing social unrest, pushing democratization from below. Political discontent with the Institutional Revolutionary Party led to several electoral victories by the conservative National Action Party and the center-left Democratic Revolutionary Party in the 1990s. Although electoral reforms in 1997 resulted in stricter safeguards against fraud and removed the Federal Electoral Institute from the control by the Institutional Revolutionary Party, many Mexicans remain disenchanted with the electoral process. In addition, the fact that the legislative branch has little control over the policy process compared with the powerful Mexican presidency is an impediment to real democracy in Mexico. One observer described the political process in Mexico in the following way: "A new Mexico is being defined by the confluence of two powerful forces: the hegemonic, culturally destructive project of Mexican neoliberalism, and the popular struggle to survive." 5

Popular uprising and guerrilla movements

On Jan. 1, 1994, the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) emerged from the southern state of Chiapas and fought a brief armed rebellion against the Mexican army. The Zapatistas, mostly men and women of Mayan origin, see themselves as full citizens of Mexico. Zapatista leader Subcomandante Marcos has built worldwide support for indigenous struggles in Mexico through savvy orchestration of news media and the Internet. In Chiapas, the Zapatistas encouraged creation of autonomous indigenous communities. In contrast to the neoliberal idea that land belongs to its buyer, the Zapatistas assert the right of indigenous people to control the natural resources found on Indian land. This is important because the southern states of Chiapas, Oaxaca, and Guerrero are rich sources of oil, natural gas, timber, uranium, and fertile land. The emergence of the EZLN captured the attention of Mexican "civil society" (ethnic, neighborhood, or other interest groups that are not of the major political parties) and helped rejuvenate indigenous and other social movements.

In addition to the EZLN, several lesser-known armed groups recently appeared on the scene. Military intelligence has identified six different groups operating in seventeen states. The Popular Revolutionary Army first emerged in June 1996 in the state of Guerrero. It is based in indigenous, peasant, and urban movements and seeks to overthrow the Mexican government. At first, Mexican officials dismissed the group as a band of delinquents, but the Popular Revolutionary Army has shown its capabilities by staging simultaneous attacks in different parts of the country. Although it has taken a hard line stance in relation to Mexican authority, stating it would not enter into negotiations with "assassins," it does work with other political organizations in Mexico. Another armed group, the Revolutionary Army of the Popular Insurgence, emerged in 1998 after several of its members and community leaders were massacred by the Mexican Army in Guerrero. The Mexican government has used the militant stance of these groups as an excuse to militarize regions with popular discontent and, in particular, areas with large indigenous populations.

The militarization of Mexico

The current process of militarization in Mexico began more than a decade ago when former President Carlos Salinas began to use the Mexican army to control popular outrage after the fraudulent 1988 presidential election. The corruption and decay of police forces and the judicial system as well as the social costs of the Mexican neoliberal project have spurred the Mexican government to increasingly use the military to suppress social unrest, control crime, and head the drug war. President Zedillo emerged as an ardent supporter of military involvement in internal law enforcement and antidrug efforts. Unfortunately, the underlying problems of poverty, racial discrimination, and lack of access to democratic participation in government remain largely unaddressed by the Mexican government.

It is important to note that Article 129 of the Mexican Constitution does not specifically give the army policing or public security functions; in fact, it limits the army's role to national security.6 Nevertheless, following the 1994 Zapatista uprising, the Mexican government introduced troops into indigenous areas, particularly in Chiapas.

In 1995, several laws made official the new internal role of the Mexican military. One law cleared the army to participate in public security (the fight against common crime); another rescinded an earlier law that prohibited involvement of the army in political matters.7 Furthermore, the NACLA Report on the Americas stated that a secret Mexican military document, leaked in 1995, called for "immediate establishment of special forces units, training programs in urban and suburban operations, and a permanent, rapid reaction force in Chiapas." The document also proposed a "redefinition of the traditional mission of the national defense to encompass a role in internal security and called for a larger intelligence capability."8 The United States has supported an internal law enforcement and counternarcotics role for the Mexican military and has provided military aid and training to the Mexican military. (See below.)

The changing role of the Mexican military is illustrated by recent events in Chiapas, where the Mexican army has embraced a counterinsurgency mission against the Zapatistas. Even though the government signed a cease-fire agreement with the EZLN in early 1994, the Mexican army launched a military offensive against the Zapatistas in February 1995. Failing to defeat the EZLN and facing strong international criticism, the Mexican government pursued a strategy of low-level irregular warfare. According to many Mexican observers, a key part of this strategy was formation of paramilitary groups who terrorized the civilian population, undermining support for the Zapatista rebellion. In this context, the December 1997 massacre of 45 villagers in Acteal, Chiapas, and the resulting displacement of 10,000 people are best understood, not as an aberration, but as a concerted attempt to isolate Zapatista rebels. The repressive strategy of the Mexican government greatly affects groups who support democratic mediation of the Chiapas conflict, as well as other social groups in Mexico. There are now an estimated 50,000 to 70,000 troops in Chiapas, and the Mexican army is a key authority in parts of the Mexican states of Chiapas, Oaxaca, Jalisco, Guerrero, and Sinaloa.9

Another change in the traditional role of the Mexican military has been its increasing political power within Mexico. One manifestation of this trend is that military officials are being placed in important civilian positions. For example, in the state of Oaxaca, a military official was given a high-level job in the education department so he could root out members of the Popular Revolutionary Army from among the teachers.

With the strain of adapting to new roles, the facade of a monolithic Mexican military has been shattered. A Dec. 21, 1998, article in The New York Times reported: "In a broad display of internal division that has no precedent in modern Mexican history, several dozen dissident soldiers, led by a lieutenant colonel, have emerged to publicly criticize government economic policies and civilian control of the military."

Drug trafficking and corruption

The shadowy drug trade is a key part of the Mexican economy and an irritant in U.S./Mexico relations. The scale of the drug trade is immense: it is estimated that roughly 70 percent of South American cocaine and 80 percent of imported marijuana enters the United States via Mexico. Mexico's cartels earn approximately $30 billion to $50 billion a year from drug sales in the United States, dwarfing the $7 billion earned from oil exports, Mexico's largest legal commodity. This drug money is laundered and often invested in "legitimate" businesses that are taxed by the government, thus making its way back into the formal economy. The approximately $500,000 per year in bribes paid to law enforcement officials, politicians, and military officers is another way drug money re-enters the Mexican economy. Although publicly the United States government takes a hard-line stance against drug trafficking, the reality is that a 50-percent cut in drug revenues would cripple an already fragile Mexican economy. Drug trafficking creates a demand for weapons on the part of Mexican authorities and drug traffickers. This demand is often met by the U.S. arms industry through government-sponsored arms transfer programs (see below) and through a black market of arms purchased in the United States.

The annual ritual of drug certification,* Mexico's inclusion in NAFTA, and the hard-line rhetoric of the war on drugs have heightened U.S. pressure on Mexico to deal with drug trafficking. Because Mexican police were the force originally assigned to the antidrug mission, they were the first to be corrupted. In 1996, the Mexican attorney general estimated that 70 percent to 80 percent of the judicial police force was corrupt. To overcome the problem of corrupt and abusive police forces, U.S. military advisors began to push for military involvement in antinarcotics as a "clean" alternative.** In a 1995 antinarcotic plan, President Zedillo began militarizing counternarcotics efforts by mandating a military role in drug interdiction. Subsequently, the Mexican government allowed the army to take control of numerous provincial police forces and, in 1997, appointed an army general to serve as Mexico's drug czar. Claims that the military is less corruptible than police have been proven wrong: antinarcotics task forces specially trained and vetted by the U.S. military have been prone to corruption, and the aforementioned drug czar was fired after ten weeks for drug involvement. In the final analysis, the militarization of antinarcotics work and other types of law enforcement in Mexico have not successfully reduced the flow of drugs to the United States.

Immigration/border issues

Although the Mexico-U.S. border is more open than ever to the flow of capital, material commodities, information, and services, recent U.S. policy measures have attempted to seal it off to immigrants from Mexico and Central America. Some of the economic and social pressures that spur many thousands of Mexicans to attempt crossing into the United States are caused by the same policies that have opened the border to trade. For example, NAFTA almost entirely ignores the issue of international mobility of labor. It is important to keep in mind that the militarization on the U.S. side of the border reinforces the unequal power relationship between the two countries.

* The certification process begun in 1986 requires the U.S. Administration to identify countries with drug production or trafficking problems. Each year these countries have to be certified as having fully cooperated with the United States in fighting drugs. Decertification automatically triggers certain sanctions.

** The Mexican military has had a long-standing role in drug eradication.

U.S. military policy toward Mexico

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. military officials have increasingly linked the notion of military security to economic well-being. Since negotiation and implementation of NAFTA, economic considerations have dominated U.S. policy toward Mexico. As one political observer recently wrote: "U.S. concerns about Mexico's commitment to democratization and respect for human rights are generally framed by the more fundamental interest in maintaining the economic opening and controlling its destabilizing consequences."10

U.S. domestic backlash against immigrants also shapes U.S. policy toward Mexico. As Donald Schultz of the U.S. Army War College said, "If there were major instability in Mexico of the kind that the country was getting close to in 1994, this would provoke large-scale immigration and could carry with it violence to the United States-this is what we have to consider." Finally, the war on drugs is a major component of U.S. policy toward Mexico, although the current focus on drug interdiction has been decidedly unsuccessful in decreasing domestic drug use.

Speaking at the Mexican Ministry of Defense in 1995, former Secretary of Defense William Perry said, "My goal, and the goal of my visit, is to help our nations forge closer security ties, because when it comes to stability and security, our destinies are inextricably linked." Indeed, the U.S.-Mexican military-to-military relationship is stronger now than at any time in memory. This relationship was originally built around antinarcotics efforts. In fact, after Perry's 1995 visit to Mexico, the Mexican military agreed to accept U.S. counternarcotics assistance for the first time in several years. This military relationship has since been cemented by an unprecedented level of training programs and military exchanges. By 1997, Mexicans accounted for a third of the students at the School of the Americas and nearly a third of the students at the Inter-American Air Forces Academy. In addition, arms and equipment sales and transfers to Mexico jumped from essentially nil to an estimated $62 million in 1997.

U.S. military programs in Mexico

Military aid to Mexico is provided through numerous channels, which can result in loopholes and lack of oversight or transparency. Below is a brief description of the different programs that channel this aid to Mexico.11

Counternarcotics programs

The International Narcotics Control program, administered by the U.S. State Department, provided about $5 million in assistance to Mexico in 1998. This amount is to increase to $8 million in 1999.
Section 1004 of the 1991 National Defense Authorization Act is administered by the U.S. Department of Defense and allows for arms transfers and training for antinarcotics. In 1997, almost $30 million was provided to Mexico through Section 1004; of that, $10.8 million financed training of 829 Mexican military personnel. The 1999 estimate for Section 1004 funding for Mexico is $15.8 million.
Section 1031 of the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act authorized $8 million in 1997-1998 to be spent on parts for the seventy-three Huey helicopters that were transferred to Mexico in 1996-1997. (Mexico recently announced it is giving back these helicopters because they are too old and dangerous to fly.)
Emergency draw-downs give the president the authority to "draw down" articles and services from existing U.S. holdings in case of unforeseen emergencies, including antinarcotics. Under this provision, Mexico was granted $37 million in 1997 for Huey helicopters, spare parts, and C-26 aircraft. In 1998, only $1.1 million was drawn down for Mexican antinarcotics efforts.

Arms sales and transfers

The Foreign Military Sales Program facilitates government-to-government arms sales. Defense Department personnel carry out most logistical aspects of the program, and the State Department determines which countries can be sold arms. In 1997, U.S. companies sold $9.5 million worth of arms to Mexico through this program.

The Direct Commercial Sales Program authorizes U.S. companies to sell arms directly to foreign governments. Direct Commercial Sales agreements made with Mexico in 1997 came to $31 million. Licenses issued through this program are valid for five years, and, although the exact percentage of licenses that result in arms sales is unknown, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency estimates it to be 50 percent. The 1999 State Department estimate for Direct Commercial Sales deliveries to Mexico is $91.2 million.

The Excess Defense Articles Program allows the U.S. government to transfer defense articles no longer needed by the U.S. military. In 1997, Mexico received more than $3 million in grants from this program.

Training and foreign military interaction

The International and Military Education Training Program is the principal mechanism by which the U.S. finances training and education for foreign military personnel. Since 1996, Mexico has been the program's top recipient in the hemisphere. In 1999, approximately $1 million of this program's funds will be used to train an estimated 179 Mexican military personnel in U.S. institutions, including the infamous School of the Americas and the Inter-American Air Forces Academy. Mexico can pay to send additional students to these institutions.

Special Operations Forces Training, including air assault training for drug interdiction operations, has been provided to the Mexican Army's Air-Mobile Special Forces Groups. Mexican naval forces also receive maritime counternarcotics training, with assistance from units of the Special Operations Forces.

Foreign Military Interaction Programs include a wide variety of programs and activities that promote friendships between U.S. and foreign military personnel. The idea is that these programs will provide the U.S. military with "access" to the region's military institutions. This category includes everything from personnel exchanges to high-level military conferences.

U.S.-Mexico border programs

Joint Task Force 6 is an interagency military force active along the U.S.-Mexico border. The use of Joint Task Force 6 ground troops along the border was indefinitely suspended in 1997, but troops continue to carry out air reconnaissance and intelligence analysis, civil engineering projects, and training of local law-enforcement agencies in military-style tactics.

Human rights in Mexico

Mexicans are very lucky to have an army totally different from the other armies of Latin American. We are very lucky.

- President Zedillo, February 1998

The worsening human rights situation in Mexico suggests that the Mexican military is no longer totally different from "the other armies of Latin America." As Mexico increasingly pursues militarized solutions to social unrest to maintain political power, the result is a heightened militarization of society and increased levels of violence and human rights abuses. Abuses occur by police, military, government officials, and paramilitaries, which work together and enjoy impunity. Of particular concern is official disregard for national and international human rights organizations.

Indigenous rights and the militarization of Mexico

The conflict in Chiapas brought the issue of indigenous rights to the forefront of political life in Mexico. At least one in ten Mexicans is indigenous, and the majority of them live in conditions of extreme poverty and marginalization.13 Although the Mexican government signed the San Andres Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture, it continues to pursue a military strategy in lieu of dialogue and negotiation.

The overpowering presence of one-third of the Mexican army in Chiapas has had disastrous effects on the daily life, economy, and social and cultural fabric of indigenous communities. An estimated 15,000 indigenous people have been displaced by violence and live without adequate shelter, food, or medical attention. The constant state of fear due to the presence of troops means people are unable to work in their fields, attend school, and collect firewood or water. This results in crop loss and food shortages for people who are barely living at a subsistence level.

The combination of economic disruption, dislocation, and military presence has resulted in prostitution, marital breakdown, and the spread of disease. Bishop Samuel Ruiz states that the military presence in some cases is "destroying the very souls of the communities."14

On January 9, 1998, the army enetered into Community 19 de Mayo [Chiapas]. Sixteen women and nine children were beaten by soldiers after defending their community fromintrusion. The children who were carried by their mothers were injured as the soldiers threw stones at them, hit them with clubs, and tried to snatch them from their mothers.... Women and children who had fallen were forced to get up with blows from the butts of rifles and shovels....A seven-month-old baby lost consciousness from blows she receieved. Two women received deep cuts to their heads. Until internaitonal observers arrived, the community was too frightened to leave to seek medical attention.

- Testimony from community members, as reported by Global Exchange

In the neighboring states of Oaxaca and Guerrero, which also have large populations of indigenous and impoverished people, state efforts to repress political opposition and social unrest have resulted in a similar pattern of militarization, human rights abuses, and impunity. A Guerrero-based human rights organization reports that the military build-up in the state resulted in an illegal flow of weapons, drug trafficking, and generalized instability and violence.15 In May 1999, members of the Mexican army killed an indigenous boy and young man and raped two indigenous women in the Rancho Nuevo township of Guerrero.16

Human rights controls and U.S. aid to Mexico

Public pressure and advocacy are needed to ensure enforcement of existing mechanisms for protection of human rights:

Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act seeks to block security assistance to governments that engage in a "consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."

The Leahy Amendment stipulates that any unit receiving U.S. aid must be screened for human rights violations, and effective measures must be taken to bring individuals or units to justice.

The vetting requirement states that any foreign military or civilian personnel applying for U.S.-funded training must be screened for human rights abuses by the U.S. Embassy in their country..

What you can do

1. Urge your senators and representatives and/or staff to:

require any further U.S. training or export of equipment to Mexican security forces to be monitored by a tracking program.
request that Senator Leahy and Representative Pelosi reintroduce the Leahy/Pelosi Sense-of-the-Congress Resolution on Chiapas to ensure U.S. military aid does not contribute to human rights violations, disarm paramilitary groups and reduce the military presence in Chiapas, set in motion concerted negotiation efforts with UN assistance, and establish respect for human rights monitors.
support the bill to close the School of the Americas.

2. Join a delegation to Mexico to learn firsthand about the effects of militarization.

3. Talk with editors of local newspapers and other media contacts in your area about issues they should cover regarding Mexico.

4.Organize a meeting and use this report to update, educate, and build a constituency on Mexico in your area.

MORE STEPS YOU CAN TAKE

Help to diffuse information nationally and internationally about the human rights situation in Mexico.

See WOLA recommendations for Activist Approaches to U.S. Policy in Mexico.

Participate in a delegation to Chiapas, Tabasco or Guerrero where the role of international observation and accompaniment has helped to document and raise awareness of the situation in these areas.
Support the Hemispheric Social Alliance.
Join the campaign to close the School of the Americas
Join the Jubilee 2000 Campaign

Participate in Fair Trade Initiatives. (Mexico’s second biggest export next to oil is coffee)

Pressure the U.S. to sign the Convention on Ecological Biodiversity.
Buy Green Energy

Resources for advocacy work

For more information and analysis, contact:

Sipaz (Servicio Internacional para la Paz / International Service for Peace)
Box 2415, Santa Cruz, CA 95063
telephone and fax: (408) 425-1257
e-mail: sipaz@igc.org; website: http://www.nonviolence.org/sipaz

Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)
1630 Connecticut Ave., N.W., 2nd Floor, Wash., DC 20009
tele: (202) 797-2171; fax: (202) 797-2172
e-mail: wola@wola.org; website: http://www.wola.org

The Latin America Working Group
110 Maryland Ave., N.E., Box 15, Suite 203, Wash., DC 20002
tele: (202) 546-7010; fax: (202) 543-7647
e-mail: lawg@igc.org; website: http://www.igc.org/lawg

AFSC Community Relations Unit, Mexico-U.S. Border Program
1501 Cherry St., Philadelphia, PA 19102-1479
tele: (215) 241-7134
e-mail: lperez@afsc.org; website: http://www.afsc.org/community/mexico-us-border.htm

AFSC Peacebuilding Unit, Latin America/Caribbean Program
1501 Cherry St., Philadelphia, PA 19102-1479
tele: (215) 241-7180; fax: (215) 241-7177
e-mail: ncardona@afsc.org; website: http://www.afsc.org/lac

For information on delegations to Mexico, contact:

Center for Global Education
Augsburg College, 2211 Riverside Ave., Minneapolis, MN 55454
tele: (612) 330-1159; fax: (612) 330-1695
e-mail: globaled@augsburg.edu;
website: http://www.augsburg.edu/global

Global Exchange
2017 Mission St., No. 303, San Francisco, CA 94110
tele: (415) 255-7296; fax: (415) 255-7498
e-mail: info@globalexchange.org
website: http://www.globalexchange.org

Mexico Solidarity Network
1247 E Street, S.E., Wash., DC 20003
tele: (202) 544-9355
e-mail: msn@mexicosolidarity.org
website: http://www.mexicosolidarity.org

Note: Links are for information purposes only and do not imply endorsement

Notes

http://www.mexicocity.com.mx/perfil.html
Tom, Barry, ed., Mexico: A Country Guide, Albuquerque: The Interhemispheric Resource Center, 1992, pp. 3-11.
Barkin, et al., "Globalization and Resistance: the Remaking of Mexico," NACLA Report on the Americas, Jan./Feb. 1997, pp. 18-27.
Karen Hansen-Kuhn, "Clinton, NAFTA, and the Politics of U.S. Trade," NACLA Report on the Americas, Sept./Oct. 1997, p. 26.
"Contesting Mexico," NACLA Report on the Americas, Jan./Feb. 1997, p.13.
Alejandro Nadal, "Terror in Chiapas," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1998.
Equipo de Ciencias Sociales del Centro de Estodios Sociales y Culturales 'Antonio de Montesinos,' "El Proceso de militarizacion en Mexico," 1999.
J. Patrice McSherry, "The Emergence of 'Guardian Democracy,'" NACLA Report on the Americas, Nov./Dec. 1998, p. 23.
Andreas, "The Political Economy of Narco-Corruption in Mexico," Current History, April 1998, p. 160.
Tom Barry and Martha Honey, Global Focus: A New Foreign Policy Agenda, 1997-1998, Interhemispheric Resource Center and Institute for Policy Studies, 1997, p. 129.
Adam Isacson and Joy Olson, Just the Facts, The Latin America Working Group, 1998, and Just the Facts website: http://www.ciponline.org/facts.
SIPAZ Report, January 1997, p.3.
SIPAZ Report, January 1997, p.5.
"On the Offensive," Global Exchange, June 1988, p.11.
John Ludwick, "Social Chaos and Military Build-up," Mexico NewsPak, Jan. 18, 1999, p. 4.

Triunfo Elizalde, "Mäs Violaciones y homicidios si el Ejëcito sigue en La Montaña," La Jornada, May 12, 1999, Contraportada